When UK Ministry of Defence issued its now-famous three-word warning — "We see you" — it wasn’t just a message to Moscow. It was a signal to the world that Britain’s military is watching, always, in the waters that matter most. On November 23, 2025, the Royal Navy confirmed it had intercepted two Russian vessels — the RFN Stoikiy corvette and the Yelnya tanker — as they passed through the Dover Strait and into the English Channel. The operation wasn’t a one-off. It was the latest chapter in a 14-day surveillance campaign that’s reshaped how Britain defends its waters.

Shadowing the Shadowers

The HMS Severn, a River-class patrol ship built for shallow-water operations, didn’t chase or confront. It shadowed. For days, it kept pace with the Russian vessels, maintaining a discreet distance while relaying real-time data to NATO allies. When the Russian ships neared the coast of Brittany, France, command was handed off — not because the threat faded, but because coordination was working. "This isn’t about showmanship," said Commander Grant Dalgleish, captain of the HMS Severn. "It’s about persistence. We don’t need to be in their face. We just need to be there. And they know it." Meanwhile, in the far north, the Royal Air Force was dealing with something more sinister. On November 19, 2025, Defence Secretary John Healey revealed that the Russian intelligence vessel Yantar — a ship designed to map undersea cables — had targeted RAF pilots with high-powered lasers during surveillance flights north of Scotland. "This isn’t just reckless," Healey said. "It’s deeply dangerous. These aren’t accidental flashes. They’re deliberate attempts to blind our crews."

Electronic Warfare in Plain Sight

The laser incident wasn’t isolated. Around the same time, the HMS Somerset, a Type 23 frigate, and several civilian vessels reported GPS jamming in the North Sea. The Ministry of Defence called it "unprofessional behaviour," but insiders say it’s part of a broader pattern. Russian vessels have been testing the limits of electronic warfare — not to sink ships, but to confuse them. To make navigation unreliable. To erode trust in systems that modern navies depend on.

And it’s working. In the past two years, Russian naval activity near UK waters has jumped 30 percent, according to MoD data. That’s not just more ships. It’s more frequent, more coordinated, and more focused on critical infrastructure. The undersea cables running from the UK to Europe — the arteries of global finance, internet traffic, and military comms — are now a primary target. "They’re not trying to start a war," said former NATO intelligence officer Dr. Eleanor Voss. "They’re trying to make us question whether we can keep the peace."

A New Front in the North Atlantic

In response, the UK has gone global. Three P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft have been permanently stationed at Keflavik Air Base in Iceland. These aren’t just surveillance planes — they’re flying sensor suites, capable of detecting submarines from miles away, tracking surface vessels with radar, and even picking up acoustic signatures of underwater cables being tampered with.

It’s part of a wider NATO push. Last month, two RAF aircraft — a Rivet Joint electronic intelligence plane and a P-8 — flew a 10,000-mile loop from the Arctic, past Belarus and Ukraine, into the Black Sea. Supported by a US Stratotanker, they collected data on Russian naval movements from the High North to the southern flank. "This isn’t about provocation," said a senior MoD official on condition of anonymity. "It’s about deterrence. If they think we’re blind, they’ll test us. We’re making sure they know we’re not."

Russia’s Response: Denial and Deflection

The Russian Federation’s Embassy in London dismissed the UK’s claims as "provocative statements," insisting its ships "operate legally in international waters and pose no threat." But the evidence tells a different story. The RFN Stoikiy and Yelnya are confirmed components of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet — a force that’s been increasingly deployed far beyond its traditional waters since 2022. Even the timing of these patrols lines up with major NATO exercises in the North Atlantic. Coincidence? Unlikely.

Meanwhile, on November 20, 2025, the UK, US, and Australia jointly sanctioned Media Land, a Russian cyber group tied to attacks on UK companies. The message is clear: this isn’t just a naval standoff. It’s a multi-domain campaign — physical, electronic, and digital — all converging on British interests.

What’s Next?

The UK has no plans to scale back. In fact, the MoD is accelerating its "From the English Channel to the High North" surveillance strategy. New patrol vessels are being fast-tracked for delivery by 2027. The RAF is expanding its P-8 fleet by 50 percent. And NATO is finalizing a new maritime coordination protocol, with the UK at the center.

But the real question isn’t about ships or planes. It’s about resilience. Can Britain protect its undersea cables if they’re targeted during a crisis? Can its allies trust its intelligence if GPS systems are routinely jammed? The answer, for now, is yes — but only because they’re watching. And they’re not looking away.